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The True Presumption of Death in New York
"It is a rule of presumption, that, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, a person shall be taken to be dead, when he has
been absent seven years and not heard from."'
Recent New York cases seem fairly to put the inquiry, to what
extent has this rule of the substantive law of persons been adopted
in this state? 2 In Matter of Benjamin,3 the Surrogate refused
to find the death of a person absent thirty-seven years and not
heard from, and, upon an elaborate consideration of authorities,
concluded that "The presumption of the continuation of human
life and the presumption of death are not presumptions of law
but of fact."4 The decree of the Surrogate was reversed. 5
"This court," the Appellate Division wrote, "has so recently laid
down rules as to the presumption of death arising from longcontinued and unexplained absence that no further discussion of
that question is now required. (See Matter of Wagener, 143
1. Thayer, Prelim. Treat. on Ev., page 319: "A rule of presumption
does not merely say that such and such a thing is a permissible and usual
inference from other facts, but it goes on to say that this significance
shall always, in the absence of other circumstances, be imputed to them.
*
" id., page 317.
2. "The so-called presumption of death from uncontroverted proofs
of disappearance, or unaccountable absence, of a person for seven or
more years, is a very modern presumption." Per Fowleri S., in Matter of
Benjamin, 77 Misc., 434, 438. It had no place in the common law when
New York became a sovereign state.
3. Supra.
4. "Presumptions of fact are but inferences drawn from other facts
and circumstances in the case, and should be made upon the common
principles of induction." Per Mason, J., In O'Gara v. Eisenlohr, 38 N. Y.,
296, 303. The distinction is taken in Matter of Kindberg, 207 N. Y., 220,
227-228, per Cullen, Ch. J.
5. 155 App. Div., 233.
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App. Div., 286; Cerf v. Diener, 148 id., 15o)." 8 The judgment
in Cerf v. Diener has since been reversed by the Court of Appeals.7
This rule of presumption has found frequent announcement
in the New York cases. Thus in Eagle v. Emmet8 its scope and
historical evolution were stated:
"The common law is in accordance with the civil law,
in the adoption of the principle, that the continuation of
life is presumed until the contrary is shown. The statutes
relative to bigamy, and to leases for life (i Jtac., I, c. ii,
§2; 19 Car., 2, c. 6),9 made an inroad upon this doctrine,
and established a rule which was ultimately adopted by
way of analogy, in cases beyond the purview of the
statutes. Accordingly, when a party has been absent seven
years since any intelligence of him, he is in contemplation
of law presumed to be dead. * * * When there are
no facts material to the solution of the question, except
simply, absence without being heard of, then at the end
of seven years the law presumes death. But still the
point remains open, when the death occurred, 10 whether
at the beginning or at the end of the seven years, or at
what other time.""u
No purpose would now be served by detailed comment upon
the earlier cases stating the rule.12 The Appellate Division deems
6. Per Dowling, J.
7. 210 N. Y., 156.
S. 4 Bradf., 117; 3 Abb. Pr., 218.
9. There are similar statutes in New York. Penal Law, Sees. 940,
341; Code Civ. Pro., Sec. 841.
10. "The presumption or inference of death in any event relates only
to the fact of death, and whenever it is material, the exact time of death
must be established by distinct proof." Per Fowler, S., in Matter of
Benjamin, 77 Misc., supra., page 448.
11. Per Bradford, S.
12. These are cited in the briefs of counsel in 210 N. Y.. supra; upon
any consideration of them the sententious observation of the Surrogate
in Eagle v. Emmet, supra, that "There can be no doubt that under certain circumstances this is to be treated as a question of fact," should be
remembered. When the basis to an inference of the time of actual death
has been supplied, the rule of presumption has fulfilled its function and
disappears; the matter is then one of evidential values only.
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the rule to have been so sufficiently considered in Matter of
Wagener, spra, "That it is unnecessary to indulge in a rediscr ssion of the general subject." 12
The facts in Afatter of Benjamin, supra, are thus stated by
the Appellate Division:
"* * * It appears that Bridget Shannon (the absentee) arrived in America in 1863, being then about
twenty-four years of age. She obtained employment at
Belleville, N. J., in the home of Dr. Ward, where Margaret Fitzpatrick, another sister, was also employed. She
remained with this family for ten years, or until 1873,
when, without a word to anyone as to her purpose or intention, with no known or assignable cause, and with no
suggestion of any reason therefor, she suddenly disappeared from the place of her employment, leaving behind
her a trunk containing her clothes, and taking with her
nothing save her then wearing apparel. She was then
unmarried, and there is no suggestion that she married
thereafter. From that time until the making of the application herein, no letter or message of any kind has
ever been received from her; she has not been seen by
any member of her family; they had never received any
information as to any other person having seen or heard
from her, and she disappeared effectually and completely
from human vision. Were she living she would now be
about seventy-three years of age. At the time of her disappearance her sister, Mary Benjamin, who came to this
country with her, was employed and living in the City
of Newark, N. J., and she has been in that vicinity ever
since. Her sister, Margaret Fitzpatrick, with whom she
worked at Dr. Ward's, visited the Ward household after
leaving their employment, and at the time of Bridget's
disappearance was living in Orange, N. J., where she lived
until 19oi, and where her family have ever since resided.
Mrs. Ward, who is still living, has never heard of Bridget
since. Effort has been made by search through the various bureaus of vital statistics, and in insane asylums, as
well as by calls upon persons likely to know of her continued existence, to ascertain whether any trace of Bridget
Shannon could be found, but in every instance without
success."
13. Per Scott, 3., in Cerf v. Diener, 148 App. Div., supra. And
Dowling, J., in Matter of Benjamin, 165 APP. Div., supra.
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The decision was:
"*

*

*

It seems clear that under the facts in this

case Bridget Shannon must be presumed to have been
dead at the expiration of seven years from the date of
her disappearance, and at the latest by December 31,
1882, which is seven years from the latest date, by the
most liberal calculation, that can be deemed to have been
the time of her disappearance."
In Matter of the Board of Educationof New York, 14 the facts,
substantially, were that an award made for real property in condemnation proceedings had been deposited with the city chamberlain and the widow and heirs-4t-law of the owner of the property petitioned to have the fund paid over to them upon the
ground that more than seven years had elapsed since the owner
had last been seen or heard from by members of his family.
The petition was denied.
"*

*

*

Death must be proved," said the Court of

Appeals. "but it may be established by presumption as
well as by direct evidence. But the facts must be disclosed
which would raise such presumption.

*

*

*

It is the

duty of the Court to proceed with care and insist upon
there being produced before it all the evidence there is
upon the subject. This it properly should exact. * * *
14. 173 N. Y., 322.
The ratio decidendi of this case has not been the same thing to its
reviewers. It has been cited for the proposition, "In general a person is
presumed to be alive until after.such time as he would die of old age,"
26 Harvard Law Review, 378; and its effect has thus been stated: "The
result in New York, therefore, is that with the exception of these two
cases (provided for by See. 841, Code Civ. Pro.), there is no presumption

of death as affecting rights in real property." 9 Columbia Law Review,
437.
Co ._-sion has resulted, perhaps, from the Court's quotation from
Best on Ev., a writer whose treatment of the general subject of presumptions has been criticized by high authority. Thayer, Cases on Ev., page
42, note 4. The language of Best is hardly clearer because we are not
without a definition of "presumptive evidence." Justice vLang, 52 N. Y.,
323, 329. And see Merkley v. Cline, 145 App. Div., 629.
The phrase "by satisfactory evidence" in Code Civ. Pro., Sec. 2656,
emphasized In Matter of the Board of Education of New York, supra,
page 325, is now omitted. Code Civ. Pro., Sec. 2766.
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The Appellate Division, in denying the appellant's motion
in this proceeding, gave the petitioners the right to renew
the motion upon further proof. The petitioners should
have adopted this course and exhausted all the evidence
that they were capable of producing upon the subject." 5
An analysis of these cases, it is submitted, indicates that the
difficulty is the definition of "unexplained absence" in the varied
statements of the rule.
The absence may be explained by its intrinsic circumstancesby the situation during the seven years. 1 It may be explained
by its antecedent circumstances, that is to say, by the situation
of the absentee before disappearance. It may be explained by
facts after the expiration of the seven years.
Must the proponent of the presumption show the absentee to
have been so situated before disappearance that the absence during the seven years is not explained on some reasonable and fair
hypothesis other than that of death? Matter of the Board of
Educationof New York, sufra, would seem to answer this question in the affirmative. He who a!serts the presumption must,
in the first instance, tender whatever proof he can, upon all these
phases of the disappearance, and the Court is to derive therefrom
an inference of unexplained absence; he cannot by silence, or
upon incomplete details regarding these phases, fairly claim a
finding that the absence is unexplained.
Whether or not the situation of the absentee previously to his
disappearance explains his absence during the seven years is, of
course, a question of fact, and the inference drawn as an answer
to that question in the particular case is a so-called presumption
of fact; and, considered from a negative viewpoint, such inference is not at all concerned with the question of death, and is to
be drawn, or not, before the point is reached for applying the
true presumption of death. If the inference drawn from such
antecedent situation is that the seven years' absence is unex15. Per Haight, J.
16. According to all statements of the rule the absence must be, to
use the stock phrase, "without tidings." ,In New York it is required that
a fruitless inquiry must have been directed to the place where the
absentee was last known to be. Dunn v. Travis 56 App. Div., 317.
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plained, a case is presented requiring the application of such true
presumption, but, if the contrary inference is drawn, the rule of
presumption has never been in the case.
It would seem that the Surrogate in Matter of Benjamin,
supra, was of opinion that the situation of the absentee before
disappearance fairly explained the absence during the seven
years.
"Here Bridget Shannon was shown to be young and in
health when she left her service abruptly. She had then
no family other than collaterals, to whom she was under
no moral obligations. She was then as free as the wind
to go and come where she wished without explanation to
anvone. She then had no fixed home of h'er own. She
had no usual place of resort which even might be assumed
to take the place of a home. Not until she married could
she be said to have even a domicile. In her case there is
no presumption, from mere change of habitat, that after
seven years she is dead."
The Surrogate's statement of the rule may well be thought not
to be at variance with that of the Appellate Division.
"While it is undoubtedly now true that in some cases
of absence or disappearance, where there are no rebutting
circumstances, after a continuous seven years' absence
without tidings, the burden of proof 17 will be shifted to
those who assert continuous life, yet very slight circumstances will alter such rule, and then the burden of proof
will not be shifted."
The apparent inconsistencies in the cases are probably reconcilable when it is considered that the differences have been in decisions of the question of fact: Did the situation of the absentee
before disappearance fairly explain his absence during the seven
years? Such is the import of the remark in Matter of Wagener,
supra, that "Each case must necessarily depend upon its own
facts," and of the dismissal of the appeal in Matter of the Board
of Educationof New York, supra, upon the ground that "The
question involved in this case is purely one of fact."
17. In the sense of going forward with evidence to repel the presumption. Thayer. Cases on Evidence, page 43.
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No decision in this state has been discovered in which, after it
had been found that the complete circumstances of the disappearance left the absence unexplained, the Court refused to apply
the rule of presumption. Matter of Benjanmn, i55 App. Div.,
supra. did apply that rule.1 8
JOHN T. LOUGHRAN.
FORDHAm LAW SCHOOL.

18. Cf. Jackson v. Claw, 18 Johns., 347; Matter of Sullivan, 51 Hun,
378; Matter of Wagener, supra.
Cerf v. Dliener, 148 App. Div., supra, reversed, 210 N. Y., supra, decides nothing to the contrary. Whether or not the facts of the absentee's
disappearance in that case were such that the rule of presumpition would annex to them its prima facie consequence, the true
presumption, being rebuttable, would be overriden by the rule of the substantive law of real property applied in the case. "It is well settled that
such a purchaser of real estate as the defendant is entitled to a marketable title and that he will not be compelled to take property the possession of which he may be obliged to defend by litigation, or to receive a
title that is subject to probable claims by another, so that it will not be
reasonably free from any doubt which would interfere with its market
value." Per Hiscock, J., 210 N. Y., supra, page 161. And see, Vought v.
Williams, 120 N. T., 253

